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COMPETITIVE OPERATION OF MUNICIPALLY AND
PRIVATELY OWNED UTILITIES
Charles M. Kneier*

I
COMPETITION

v.

MONOPOLY

PUBLIC

utility services for cities are usually provided on the principle of regulated monopoly.1 It has been found that by the very
nature of the utility business, better service can be had anc_l at cheaper
rates by the use of one supplier rather than by the use of competing
plants: This one plant having a monopoly of the business may be
either privately or municipally O\'Vned. If the service is furnished by
a privately owned utility, regulation is usually by a state commission,
but in a few states regulation is still largely by the city in which the
company operates. In the case of municipally owned utilities, regulation is usually provided indirectly by the electorate in their control
over the city government; but in some states, the state commission has
jurisdiction over municipally owned utilities, as well as over those
which are privately owned.
In some cities competition has been substituted for the principle of
monopoly in supplying utility services.2 This is usually the result of
the city's entering into competition with an established privately owned
utility. Where a city is the first to enter the field its control over the
streets is in most cases adequate to enable it to pr~vent a privately
owned utility from setting up a competing plant.3
"Ph.D., Univ. of Illinois; J.D., Univ. of Michigan. Chairman of the Department
of Political Science and Acting Director of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs,
Univ. of Illinois. Author: STATE REGULATION OF PuBLIC UTILITIES IN ILLINOIS; CouNTY
GovERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (with John A. Fairlie); C1TY GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES; ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIALS IN MuNICIPAL GovERNMENT AND ADMINIS·
TRATION.-Ed.
1 On control of competition in the public utility field see TROXEL, EcoNOMICS OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES, c. 9 (1947).
2 ELECTRIC PowER AND GovERNMENT PoLicY, Twentieth Century Fund, "Duplication
of Private Facilities by Municipal Systems," p. 395 (1948).
3 For cases where certificates of convenience and necessity were granted by state commissions to privately owned utilities to compete with existing municipal utilities see Re Mackay Light and Power Co., (Idaho 1919) P.U.R., 1919£, 482; Re Pacific Greyhound Lines,
(Colo. 1940) 35 P.U.R. (n.s.) 477.
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II
PRIVATE ilTILITIEs' ARcuMENTS

A. Competition Termed Wasteful
Privately ownecl utilities furnishing service in cities have attempted
to block the efforts of municipalities to construct new plants to enter
into competition with them. They have attempted to convince the
voters that regulated monopoly is the wise policy and that competition
is wasteful and inefficient. They have fought hard in the courts to
protect what they consider to be their legal rights. As will be pointed
out later, they have in some states resorted to the legislature for statutory recognition of the principle of regulated monopoly, even as against
invasion of the field by a municipally owned utility.

B. Franchise Claimed to Give 1\II.onopoly
Privately owned utilities have relied upon their franchise provisions
to block efforts by cities to construct competing plants. The result
depends upon the provisions of the franchise under which the utility
is operating-upon what the city has bound itself to do or not to do
during the period of the franchise.
A city may enter into competition with a privately owned utility
where the latter is operating under a non-exclusive franchise or where
its franchise has expired.4 The courts have taken the position in interpreting franchises that public grants are to be strictly construed and
that the grantee is to take nothing by inference. All doubts concerning
the existence of an agreement by a city not to compete with a privately
owned utility are resolved in favor of the public.5 The question as to
4Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U.S. 388, 7 S. Ct. 916 (1887); Skaneateles Water
Works Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U.S., 354, 22 S. Ct. 400 (1902); Bienville Water Supply Co.
v. Mobile, 175 U.S. 109, 20 S. Ct. 40 (1889), 186 U.S. 212, 22 S. Ct. 820 (1902); Joplin
v. Southwest Missouri Light Co., 191 U.S. 150, 24 S. Ct. 43 (1903); Helena Water Works
Co. v. Helena, 195 U.S. 383, 25 S. Ct. 40 (1904); Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200
U.S. 22, 26 S. Ct. 224 (1906); Madera Water Works v. Madera, 228 U.S. 454, 33 S. Ct.
571 (1913); Mayor,-:Meridian v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1906) 143 F.
67; Glenwood Springs v. Glenwood Light and Water Co., (C.C.A. 8th, 1912) 202 F. 678;
Kansas Gas and Electric Co. v. Independence, (C.C.A. 10th, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 32, rehearing
den., (C.C.A. 10th, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 638; Kansas Power Co. v. Hoisington, (C.C.A. 10th,
1937) 89 F. (2d) 358.
5 The principle that public grants are to be strictly construed goes back to Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (36 U.S.) 420 (1837). Also see Hamilton Gas Light and
Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U.S. 258, 13 S. Ct. 90 (1892); Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N.Y. 167, 22 N.E. 381 (1889); North Michigan Water Co. v. Escanaba, 199 Mich.
286, 165 N.W. 847 (1917), cert. den., 248 U.S. 561, 39 S. Ct. 7 (1918); Missouri Utilities
Co. v. City of California, (D.C. Mo. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 454; West Tennessee Power and Light
Co. v. Jackson, (C.C.A. 6th, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 979; West Tennessee Power and Light Co. v.
Jackson, (D.C. Tenn. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 57; Metropolitan-Edison Co. v. Ickes, (D.C. Colo.
1938) 22 F. Supp. 639.
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whether a franchise granted by a city is exclusive is avoided in some
states by constitutional or statutory provisions prohibiting such grants. 6
Indiana specifically authorizes cities to construct municipal utilities
,"although there is operating in said municipality a public utility engaged in a similar service under a license, franchise or indeterminate
permit." The statute further states that any existing permit, license or
franchise interfering with the existence of a second utility is against
public policy.7
An agreement by a city not to grant the same privileges of providing
public utility services to another company has been held not to preclude
the city itself from building a plant for this purpose. As stated by the
Supreme Court this follows from the salutary doctrine that "special
privileges affecting the general interests are to be liberally construed in
favor of the public, and that no public body, charged with public
duties, be held upon mere implication or presumption to have divested
itself of its powers."8
Even in cases where the facts might be construed as an obligation
not to construct a competing pl~nt the courts have generally held there
was no enforceable implied promise not to do so. The reservation by
the city in granting a franchise of an option to purchase does not bind
a city to buy the plant of the company furnishing service in preference
to erecting its own.9 Neither the lease10 nor the sale11 of a municipally
owned plant to a private owner implies a promise on the part of the
city not to construct a competing system. Where the city conveyed an
electric distribution system by warranty deed the company contended
that "the general warranty in the deed included one for quiet possession, and that the installation of another distribution system in the city
will necessarily disturb the old one, and that the threatened competition will destroy the value of the franchise and take it for public use
without just compensation and thus without due process of law." The
court rejected this argument, saying that under a general warranty the
city could not disturb the possession of what it sold but that more than
one set of electric wires could be placed in the street without material
G Thrift v. Elizabeth City, 122 N.C. 31, 30 S.E. 349 (1898); Fairbanks Morse and Co.
v. Texas Power and Light Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 693; Alabama Power Co. v.
Guntersville, 235 Ala. 136, 177 S. 332 (1937), 114 A.L.R. 181; Iowa Code (1946) §397.2.
1 Ind. Stat. (Bums, 1933) §54-601.
8 Knoxville Water Qo. v. Knoxville, 200 U.S. 22 at 38, 26 S. Ct. 224 (1906). Also see
Lehigh Water Company's Appeal, 102 Pa. St. 515 at 528 (1883), affd., 121 U.S. 388, 7 S. Ct.
916 (1887); Cf. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453, 26 S. Ct. 660 (1906).
9 Thomas v. Grand Junction, 13 Colo. App. 80, 56 P. 665 (1899).
10 Western Public Service Co. v. Minatare, (C.C.A. 8th, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 844.
11 Kentucky-Tennessee Light and Power Co. v. Paris, 173 Tenn. 123, 114 S. W. (2d)
815 (1938), 118 A.LR. 1025.
.
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interference.12 The general warranty in the deed thus protected the
company from physical or material interference but not economic loss.
Also, the fact that a city in granting a franchise agrees to.use the service
of the company in lighting the streets or furnishing water for city
purposes does not preclude the construction of a municipal plant.13
A city may, of course, unless specifically prohibited by the state,
bind itself not to build a competing plant during the life of the franchise held by the privately owned utility. Such agreements are valid
and will be enforced.14
While the courts follow the general principle that a city may construct a competing plant where a private company is operating under
a non-exclusive franchise, such action m1:1st be pursuant to authority
conferred upon it by the state. The unexpired franchise rights of a
privately owned utility "constitute a property right within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, and . . . no person can lawfully
engage in competition with it to its direct injury, without authority from
the Legislature direct or derived."15 Not only must the power be given
but the proceedings must be in conformity with any procedural requirements of the constitution and statutes of the state.10
The municipal ownership movement received impetus when the
national government began making grants and loans to cities to construct utilities. In many cases the loan or grant was used to construct
a competing plant. The power to make loans and grants for this purpose was attacked in the courts, but was upheld as a proper exercise of
the povver conferred upon Congress.1 7

C. Tactics of Competitors Attacked
Privately owned utilities have questioned not only the power of
cities to establish competing plants but in particular cases have attacked
12 Mississippi Power Co. v. Aberdeen, (C.C.A. 5th, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 990 at 992. Also
see Alabama Power Co. v. Guntersville, 235 Ala. 136, 177 S. 332 (1937), 114 A.L.R. 181.
13 Bienville Water Supply Co. v. Bienville, 175 U.S. 109, 20 S. Ct. 40 (1899), 186
U.S. 212, 22 S. Ct. 820 (1902); Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co., 191 U.S. 150, 24
S. Ct. 43 (1903); Humphrey v. Pratt, 93 Kan. 413, 144 P. 197 (1914).
H Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 19 S. Ct. 77 (1898); Vicksburg
v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453, 26 S. Ct. 660 (1906), 231 U.S. 259, 34 S. Ct. 95
(1913); Westerly Waterworks v. Westerly, (C.C.D. R.I. 1896) 75 F. 181; White v. Meadville,
177 Pa. 643, 35 A. 695 (1896), 34 LR.A. 567 (1896); Metzger v. Beaver Falls, 178 Pa. 1,
35 A. 1134 (1896).
15 Colorado Central Power Co. v. Municipal Power Development Co., (D.C. Colo. 1932)
1 F. Supp. 961 at 963; Brooklyn City R. Co. v. Whalen, 191 App. Div. 737, 182 N.Y.S. 283,
affd. in 229 N.Y. 570, 128 N.E. 215 (1920); Campbell v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co.
(C.C.A. 8th, 1932) 55 F. (2d) 560.
10 Oklahoma Utilities Co. v. Hominy, (D.C. Okla. 1933) 2 F. Supp. 849; Alabama
Power Co. v. Fort Payne, 237 Ala. 459, 187 S: 632 (1939).
17 Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 58 S. Ct. 300 (1938); Duke Power Co. v.
Greenwood County, 302 U.S. 485, 58 S. ·ct. 306 (1938); Washington Water Power Co. v.
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the methods or tactics used. A Texas city before establishing a competing municipal plant solicited customers of the privately owned utility to take service from the city. In upholding the practice the court
said the only way the city could determine whether it could safely
enter the field was to ascertain the market for its product; that could
be done only by soliciting customers of the existing company. While
the court accepted the principle that "generally speaking, it is tortious
for one without justification to induce another to breach a contract," in
the present case persons under valid contracts had not been maliciously
induced to switch their business. Rather was it "a case of a planned
and consummated monopoly established by a system of exclusive contracts, enlisting the aid of a court of equity to sanction and perpetuate
it." If the city could not solicit customers for its proposed plant then
the private company would have "obtained for itself in effect what the
public policy of the state forbids towns to grant it, an exclusive
franchise." 18
Even though a city may establish a competing utility, it may not
physically interfere with an existing plant.10 Injunctive relief will be
granted to the privately owned utility in case of such interference.
Privately owned utilities have attempted to block the construction of
competing municipal plants by use of the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This has met with no success. The courts recognize that
a competing municipal plant "will render the property of the water
company less valuable and, perhaps, unprofitable,"20 and will result "in
the impairment of the investments of those who furnished money to it
in the belief that their investments would not be lost through unnecessary duplication."21 Such losses are, however, as stated by the Supreme Court, "simply misfortunes which may excite our sympathies,
but are not the subject of legal redress."22
Coeur d'Alene, (D.C. Idaho 1934) 9 F. Supp. 263, (D.C. Idaho 1938) 25 F. Supp. 795;
Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. Kennett, (C.C.A. 8th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 911; Southwestern
Gas and Electric Co. v. Texarkana, (C.C.A. 5th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 847; Central Illinois
Public Service Co. v. Bushnell, (C.C.A. 7th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 26.
18 Fairbanks, Morse and Co. v. Texas Electric Service Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1933) 63 F.
(2d) 702 at 705.
19 Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 40 S. Ct. 76 (1919);
Colorado Central Power Co. v. Municipal Power Development Co., (D.C. Colo. 1932) 1 F.
Supp. 961; Oklahoma Utilities Co. v. Hominy, (D.C. Okla. 1933) 2 F. Supp. 849; Mississippi
Power Co. v. Starkville, (D.C. Miss. 1932) 4 F. Supp. 833; Bell v. David City, 94 Neb. 157,
142 N.W. 523 (1913); Alabama Power Co. v. Guntersville, 236 Ala. 503, 183 S. 396 (1938),
119 A.L.R. 429.
20 Helena Water Works Co. v. Helena, 195 U.S. 383 at 392, 25 S. Ct. 40 (1904).
21 Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. v. City of Kennett, (C.C.A. 8th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 911.
2 2 Turnpike Co. v. The State, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 210 at 213 (1865); Skaneateles Water
Works Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354, 22 S. Ct. 400 (1902); Hamilton Gas Light and
Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U.S. 258, 13 S. Ct. 90 (1892); Carolina Power and Light
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No legal wrong results from the lawful competition of a municipally owned utility with one that is privately owned. There can be no
damage to something the private company "does not possess-namely, a
right to be immune from lawful municipal competition."23 Thus, "An
appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment to protect property from a congenital defect must be vain."24 The courts refuse to read into the Fourteenth Amendment a remedy for the error made by the privately owned
utility in failing to secure a specific agreement on the part of the city
not to set up a competing plant.
Appeals to the courts on grounds of ethics or of sound business
practice have not met with success. In a case where the value of the
property of a privately owned utility had been decreased by the competition of a subsequently constructed municipal plant, the Supreme
Court held its property had not been "taken, as that term is understood
in constitutional law. What the village ought to do in the moral aspect
of the case is, of course, not a question for us to determine."25 A privately owned utility which attempted to block the efforts of a Michigan
city to set up a competing plant argued that a condition of affairs should
not be permitted which would bring "loss to all concerned, without
profit or advantage to the city or anybody else." The Supreme Court
of Michigan answered that the certainty of loss to all concerned rested
solely upon speculation and anyway the "electors are dealing with their
own money, and, if they choose to invest it in losing enterprises, so long
as they comply with the law, it is their own concern."26

III
SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF COMPETITION

A. Rate Wars
The operation of competing municipally and privately owned utilities frequently leads to rate wars. The question arises as to the weapons
available to each party for either offense or defense in such a war. The
problem of rate wars arises in three different settings: (I) states in
which the city fixes rates for both municipally and privately owned
Co. v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, (C.C.A. 4th, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 520; Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 59 S. Ct. 366 (1939); People ex rel. Public
Utilities Commission v. City of Loveland, 76 Colo. 188, 230 P. 399 (1924).
23 Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 at 480, 58 S. Ct. 300 (1938).
24 Madera Water Works Co. v. Madera, 228 U.S. 454 at 456, 33 S. Ct. 571 (1913).
25 Skaneateles Water Works Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354 at 367, 22 S. Ct. 400
(1902).
26 Muskegon Traction and Lighting Co. v. Muskegon, 167 Mich. 331 at 340, 132 N.W.
1060 (1911).
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utilities, (2) states in which ~ state commission fixes rates for privately
owned utilities and the city for municipal utilities, and (3) states in
which a state com:rrussion fixes rates for both municipally and privately
owned utilities. In the case of competing utilities, may rate cutting be
restricted by the fixing of minimum rates, or is there a constitutional
right of ruthless, destructive competition?
In those states where power to fix rates for privately owned utilities
is vested in the city this is generally held to mean the power to establish minimum rates. This means in effect that one of the participants
has the power to call a halt in a rate war. As stated by the privately
owned utilities, it means that the city is "using its governmental robes
as a cover for the protection of its proprietary interests."27
The· experience in a Texas city may be cited as illustrative of rate
wars. The city constructed a competing plant, fixed its rates ten per
cent below those of the privately owned utility, and took over half of
its customers. The company, in the words of a United States circuit
court of appeals, then "resolutely advanced upon the municipal plant
to join battle with it on its own terms. Meeting reduction with reduction, it put into effect rates ten per cent lower than its rival had inaugurated."28 The city then enacted a minimum rate ordinance, fixing rates
ten per cent above the retaliatory rates the private company had put
into effect. The company argued that the power conferred upon the
city to fix rates was to protect consumers from overcharges and that it
did not include powei; to fix minimum rates. Since there were not .
sufficient customers to support two plants, the company maintained
that it could not under the Fourteenth Amendment be denied the effective weapon of rate cutting in the competitive struggle for existence.
The Court upheld the ordinance on the ground that the purpose
of rate regulation is to supplant wasteful competition.
''Viewing the matter in this light, we think it cannot be gainsaid that it was not only the right, but the duty of the council to
put a stop to the contest before its ruthlessness had ruined one or
both of the plants. We think too, that in doing so, on the basis of
fixing the same rate for each plant, it acted justly and well within
•
"29
1tspowers.
The view that a grant of power to fix rates includes both minimum
27 Mapleton v. Iowa Public Service Co., 209 Iowa 400, 223 N.W. 476 (1929), 68
A.L.R.993.
28 Seymour v. Texas Electric Service Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1933) 66 F. (2d) 814 at 815,
reversing (D.C. Texas 1931) 54 F. (2d) 97, cert. den. 290 U.S. 685, 54 S. Ct. 121 (1933).
201a., at 816.
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and maximum rates is generally accepted.:io To construe the ,vord
"regulate" as limiting the power granted to establishing maximum rates
would open the way for abuse by way of favoritism ancl. discrimination
within that limit.31 Privately owned utilities have advanced the argument that a rate fixed by a city is "presumptively reasonable as a maximum rate" and obviously any rate below would be "necessarily reasonabl~." This view was rejected by the Supreme Court of Iowa with the
statement that, "A public utility, operating under a franchise, has no
constitutional right of competition.";iz If monopoly is desirable in the
public utility field "then it should be created and protected by constituted authority, and not by financial power through the process of ruthless, destructive competition."33
The view that there is a constitutional right of competition has been
followed in two cases by lower federal courts, but it has since been
rejected by the Supreme Court. In a case where the Montana Public
Service Commission fixed minimum rates for two competing public
utilities the lower court held the order was unreasonable in view of the
circumstances-namely, that there was not sufficient business to support
two utilities. It would be reasonable to fix minimum rates "when the
field affords room for their application with resultant fair returns to all
occupying it .... But when the field is limited, at [and?] reasonable
rates will afford fair returns to but one, and two seek to occupy it, the
law of self-preservation and survival of the fittest invokes the right of
competition to the last extremity; and any minimum rate and order
which would prevent the struggle and condemn the rivals to the ordeal
of slow starvation is unreasonable and void." 34 A similar line of reasoning was followed in a Texas case where a municipality was enjoined
from enforcing a minimum rate ordinance against a competing utility
where the effect would be to divert patronage from the private utility
to the municipal utility. Consumers of the private plant had testified
they were its customers because its rates were lower, and that they
would cease to be such customers if its rates were made equal to that of
30 See Economic Gas Co. v. Los Angeles, 168 Cal. 448, 143 P. 717 (1914); Community
Natural Gas Co. v. Natural Gas and Fuel Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 34 S. W. (2d) 900; I!}
re Estate of Ransom, 219 Iowa 284, 258 N.W. 78 (1934).
31 Pinney and Boyle Co. v. Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp., 168 Cal. 12, 141 P. 620
(1914).
32 Mapleton v. Iowa Public Service Co., 209 Iowa 400,223 N.W. 476 (1929), 68 A.L.R.
993.
33 Coleman Gas and Oil Co. v. Santa Anna Gas Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 58 S. W.
(2d) 540 at 543, reversed on other grounds, (Tex. Comm. App. 1933) 67 S. W. (2d) 241.
34 Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission, (D.C. Mont. 1931) 52 F.
(2d) 802 at 804, (D.C. Mont. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 328, reversed, 289 U.S. 130, 53 S. Ct. 546
(1933).
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the municipal plant. The fact that some customers had already left the
private plant and that others would do so if the minimum rates were
enforced was the important factor. The Court felt whether in fact
customers would leave the private plant was more important than their
reasons for leaving, such as patriotic feeling or other consideration.
There was "no escape from the conclusion that the fixing of such minimum rate ,,·ould be, within the terms of the law, confiscatory."35
The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected this view and
held there is no constitutional right of unrestrained cutting of rates to
destroy a competitor. Minimum rates do not deny a utility just compensation or deprive it of its property without due process of law.36
In upholding the fixing of minimum rates, the courts have considered the purpose and probable results of rate wars. The purpose is to
destroy the competitor, drive him out of business and secure a monopoly. As stated by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, "these are the
natural and inevitable consequences of the cut-throat competition inaugurated by it. The presumption is indulged that a person intends to
accomplish the natural consequences of his acts." 3 ; It would appear
to be a reasonable exercise of the police pmver to prevent cut-throat
competition. The fixing of minimum rates is a means of accomplishing
this purpose.
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Mmiicipalities

The city may be at a disadvantage in a rate war since the state laws
frequently make it mandatory that cities fix rates for municipally owned
utilities to cover certain enumerated items, such as operating, maintenance, depreciation, replacement and interest charges, and debt retirement. After stating the items to be covered by rates of municipal utilities, the Indiana statute states that, "Any rate too low to meet the foregoing requirements shall be unlawful."38 In Massachusetts a city may
not fix the price of gas and electricity supplied by a municipal plant at
less than the cost of production without consent of the Department of
Public U tilities.30 Such statutes limit the power of a municipality to
meet the privately owned utility in a rate war.
3:; Texas Electric Service Co. v. City of Seymour, (D.C. Texas, 1931), 54 F. (2d) 97
at 99, reversed, (C.C.A. 5th, 1933), 66 F. (2d) 814.
311 Public Service Commission v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U.S. 130, 53 S. Ct.
546 (1933), reversing (D.C. Mont. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 802.
37 City of Farmersville v. Texas-Louisiana Power Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 55 S.W.
(2d) 195 at 202, reversed on other grounds (Tex. Comm. App. 1933), 67 S.W. (2d) 235.
38 Ind. Stat. (Burns 1933) §54-609.
30 l\Iass. Ann. Laws (1933) §164-58.
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The other side of the picture is presented when a city seeks to sell
its service at a lower rate than is charged by a privately owned utility.
The city plant has certain advantages, such as tax-exemption, which
should enable it to sell at a lower rate. May the private plant meet this
rate even though it will not give it a fair return on its investment? Or
if the statutes of the state do not require the rate ot the municipally
owned utility to cover any enumerated items, such as operating expenses, depreciation, interest, debt retirement, etc., may the city operate
its plant at a loss?
In considering these questions the Supreme Court of Utah has held
that the state commission could not establish rates for a privately owned
utility that would give it a fair return and then require a municipal
plant to charge the same.
"If taxpayers and citizens of a town or city desire through
their municipality to own and operate their own plant for their
own use and for the use of the municipality at cost, they ought
not to be denied the right or privilege, because a competitive and
privately owned utility, operating a plant for gain and profit at the
same place, may not be able profitably to furnish the product at a
rate or charge lower than its standard rate, or at a rate proposed by
the municipality. To say a municipality, its taxpayers and citizens, have the right to own and operate a utility, but may not be
permitted to operate it at a rate less than a privately owned utility
may supply the product at a reasonable profit, is, in effect, to deny
to a municipality whatever advantage or ability it may have, if any,
to furnish and supply the product at a rate or charge lower than
that of a privately owned utility for gain and profit."40
The Supre~e Court of the United States has held that "the city
is not bound to conduct the business at a profit."41 The result in this
case is competition but not cut-throat competition. If the city has
economic advantages in the operation of a utility, it should be able to
pass them on to the consumers.
In a state where a state commission fixes the rates of privately
owned utilities but municipally owned plants are not under its jurisdiction, will the state commission take into consideration the rates being
charged by the municipal plant in fixing rates for the private plant?
The Georgia Public Service Commission permitted a company serving
several cities under a uniform rate to reduce its rates in one city to meet
the competition of a municipal plant over which the commission had
40 Logan
41 Puget

City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536 at 558, 271 P. 961 (1928).
Sound Power and Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 at 625, 54 S. Ct. 542
(1934), rehearing den., 292 U.S. 603, 54 S. Ct. 712 (1934).
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no control. The commission stated it did not constitute unjust discrimination against the customers ·of the company in other cities. It is
unjust to charge different rates under "precisely the same circumstances
and conditions surrounding the service to all customers." If a public
utility were not permitted to charge such rates as were necessary to
· meet competition "it would often happen that property would be threatened if not destroyed, where competition without regulation is permitted to conduct its affairs in such manner as to take all the business away
from a given company."42 The Illinois Commerce Commission in authorizing a company serving 127 cities to reduce rates in one city to
meet the competition of a municipal plant said:
"It is well settled that one of the elements to be taken into
consideration in fixing the rates or charges of public utilities is that
of competition, and companies engaged in the utility business
may, within reason and with the consent ·and approval of regulatory bodies, meet the rates .and charges of municipally owned
competitors."43
The commission believed that justice and fair play compelled it to
permit the company to meet the municipal plant rates, but it refused
to approve rates which were "slightly lower" than those charged by
the city.44
States and cities have in some cases favored municipal utilities over
competing private plants by their tax policies. The exemption of municipally owned utilities from the general property tax is a step in this
direction. 45 In some cases a more direct use has been made of the
taxing power to favor a municipal plant. Seattle imposed a tax upon
the gross receipts of a private corporation engaged in the business of
furnishing electric light and power to consumers but it was not applicable to the competing municipal plant. In upholding the tax, the
Supreme Court held it was based on a reasonable classification, and
that "equal protection does not require a city to abstain from taxing the
business of a corporation organized for profit merely because in the
public interest the municipality has acquired like property or conducts
42 Re Georgia Power Co., (Ga. 1931) P.U.R. 1931E, 449 at 453; Georgia Public Service
Commission v. Georgia Power Co., 172 Ga. 31, 157 S.E. 98 (1931).
43 Re Illinois Northern Utilities Co., (m. 1933) 1 P.U.R. (n.s.) 449 at 452. The Utah
Public Service Commission has allowed a privately owned utility to reduce rates to meet the
competition of a municipal plant. Logan City v. Utah Power and Light Co., (Idaho 1928)
P.U.R., 1928E, 57.
·
44 Re minois Northern Utilities Co., (m. 1933) 1 P.U.R. (n.s.) 454.
4u On the constitutionality of a statute subjecting property of municipally owned light
plants beyond the corporate boundaries to taxation and exempting that part within, see Hardwick v. Wolcott, 98 Vt. 343, 129 A. 159 (1925), 39 A.L.R. 1222 (1925).
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a like business."4 1l The court followed the view that municipally and
privately owned utilities may be classified for purposes of legislation
and "that the equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination
with respect to things that are different."47 On the same principle, a
state statute imposing a tax on the production and sale of electric power
does not deny equal protection because it exempts municipalities generating electricity for the use of their customers.48 A discriminatory tax
levied upon property owners not using water from a municipal system
has been held to be invalid.40 Even the most ardent advocate of municipal ownership would have difficulty in upholding such a classification.

IV
PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC

A. Certi-ficate of Convenience and Necessity
"Legislation may protect from the consequences of competition,
but the Constitution does not.";;o The legislatures of several states have
followed that principle and by statute regulated competition by utilities.
The most generally used method to protect public utilities from the consequences of competition is to require a certificate of convenience and
necessity for municipal plants as well as for those which are privately
owned.51 Four states now require a certificate of convenience and
necessity for municipally owned utilities operating within the corporate
limits of the city. Twelve states make such a certificate a requirement
for operation beyond the corporate boundaries.
This limits, and in actual practice largely eliminates, competing
utilities. The commissions may, of course, see fit to grant certificates
to competing utilities but in practice seldom do so.52 They believe that
4G Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 at 624, 54 S. Ct. 542
(1934), rehearing den., 292 U.S. 603, 54 S. Ct. 712 (1934).
47 Also see Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E.
481 (1935); Moran v. Seattle, 179 Wash. 555, 38 P. (2d) 391 (1934).
48 South Carolina Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, (D.C. S.C., 1931) 52
F. (2d) 515, affd. 286 U.S. 525, 52 S. Ct. 494 (1932).
40 Warsaw Water Works Co. v. Warsaw, 161 N.Y. 176, 55 N.E. 486 (1899).
50 Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 at 625, 54 S. Ct. 542
(1934).
51 On the question as to whether the erection of a new light plant to replace an old one
requires a certificate of convenience and necessity, see Hagerstown v. Littleton, 143 Md. 591,
123 A. 140 (1923); Littleton v. Hagerstown, 150 Md. 163, 132 A. 773 (1926); West v.
Byron, 153 Md. 464, 138 A. 404 (1927); Re Mayor and Council of Hagerstown, (Md. 1926)
P.U.R. 1927A, 336.
52 :for cases where cities were granted a certificate of convenience and necessity even
though it meant competition with an existing company, see Re Village of McCammon, (Idaho
1916) P.U.R., 1916D, 500; In Re Gallitzin, (Pa. 1915) P.U.R. 1915A, 779; Allegheny
Valley Water Co. v. Tarentum, (Pa. 1915) P.U.R. 1915C, 174; Re City of Lamar, (Colo.
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better results can be obtained by applying a principle of regulated
monopoly and refuse to grant a certificate to a city to construct a plant
to compete with an existing privately owned utility.53 As stated by the
Pennsylvania Commission the noncompetitive policy "has proven
itself economically sound and one which we would hesitate to abandon
without compelling reasons therefor. Inadequacy of service or unreasonableness of rates are not alone sufficient, since we are empowered in such cases to apply corrective measures directly against offending public service companies, in proper proceedings."54 In a later case
the commission did grant a certificate for a competing plant and was
reversed by the superior court on the grounds that it had acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court found that the commission had
changed from a policy of regulated monopoly to one of "regulated
competition by municipalities." The evidence was held to be insufficient to warrant the grant of a certificate of public convenience to the
city for the construction of a competing plant.55
Some commissions have been inclined to abandon the noncompetitive policy where the past record of the private company is bad. The
New York Commission in authorizing a municipality to furnish service
outside its borders in territory already served by a privately owned utility stated that "unless a utility is willing fully to meet its obligations in
every direction, it could not expect to have its territory protected against
invasion."50 The utility here involved was "generally known to be
litigious" so it was considered better policy to permit the municipality
to furnish competing service rather than to rely upon a suit to compel
the private company to meet its obligations. The Colorado Commission
in approving the construction of a competing plant quoted with approval the California Railroad Commission as follows:
1919) P.U.R., 1919C, 309; Farmers Electric and Power Co. v. Ault, (Colo. 1920) P.U.R.,
1920D, 214; Re Town of Franklin, (W. Va. 1920) P.U.R., 1922E, 432; Re Village of Hustisford, (Wis. 1934) 2 P.U.R. (n.s.) 485; Re Town of Matoaka, (W. Va. 1934) 4 P.U.R.
(n.s.) 198; People ex rel Public Utilities Commission v. Loveland, 76 Colo. 188, 230 P. 399
(1924). Some states by statute prohibit the granting of a certificate where service is already
being rendered by a public utility. See S.C. Code (1942) §8555-2 (22); Ky. Rev. Stat.
(1948) §§96, 186.
53 Re Borough of Bath, (Pa. 1916) P.U.R., 1916E, 692; Re Catasauqua, (Pa. 1919)
P.U.R., 1919C, 48; ibid. 50; Re City of Benwood, (W. Va. 1934), 5 P.U.R. (n.s.) 429; Re
Mayor and Council of Hagerstown, (Md. 1923) P.U.R., 1924B, 211; Public Service Co. v.
Loveland, (Colo. 1924) P.U.R. 1924E, 516, 538; Re Niagara, Lockport and Ontario Power
Co., (N.Y. 1931) P.U.R., 1932A, 92; Re Village of Schenevus, (N.Y. 1919) P.U.R., 1919E,
735; Re Borough of Kittanning, (Pa. 1919) P.U.R., 1919F, 182; Re Bayles, (Utah, 1925)
P.U.R., 1926A, 731; Barnes Laundry Co. v. Pittsburgh, 266 Pa. 24, 109 A. 535 (1920).
54 Re Borough of Brookville, (Pa. 1929) P.U.R., 1929D, 483.
5;; Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 127 Pa. Super. Ct.•11, 191 A.
678 (1937). Also see Re Borough of Myerstown, (Pa. 1936) 12 P.U.R. (n.s.) 39.
;;u Re Village of Little Valley, (N.Y. 1938) 22 P.U.R. (n.s.) 63 at 64.
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" ... if ·we should, in the very first important contested application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity, announce the rule that where the major portion of a territory is
served, though inefficiently and at high rates, the result of such
application will be merely to put the existing utility upon its good
behavior, then we would, in effect, be saying to all the offending
utilities of this state, if there be any: 'You may proceed with your
present methods until competition knocks at the door of your territory, and only then will you be compelled to do justice,'-and we
would be saying to every new public utility: 'You will knock in
vain at the door of any field now served by a utility.' The result
would be that old utilities would keep their territory unspurred by
the fear of competition, knowing always that only ·when it was
imminent need they prepare to do justice to their patrons...."-s 7
The policy of regulated monopoly is generally a wise one, and the
certificate of convenience and necessity an effective means of carrying
it out. The real spirit of the policy, however, should be to protect the
public and not the public utility which is performing tlie service.58 The
attitude of the New York and Colorado commissions in the cases discussed above can be commended as in furtherance of that spirit.
Where efforts on the part of the public authorities to force utilities
to give reasonable rates and adequate service have met ·with long-continued litigation and obstructionist tactics, a competing plant may be
the solution. If local governments want to try that approach in such
a situation they are entitled to a sympathetic hearing by the state com:mission in passing on their application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity.

B. Use of Existing Facilities
Some states avoid the construction of competing municipal plants
by requiring the city- either to purchase or to attempt to purchase an
existing plant at a fair and reasonable price.50 If the city and the comr.1 Re City of Lamar, (Colo. 1919) P.U.R. 1919C, 309 at 318. For the view that a
municipality should not be permitted to construct a competing plant until the existing utility
had been given "due notice and opportunity to comply with its proper duty" see Re Borough
of Kittanning (Pa. 1919) P.U.R., 1919F, 182. Even though the Commission found that
the company "has not either appreciated nor performed its duty as a water company exclusively serving a community," and that "it has not made reasonable efforts to correct the erformance of its duties" it refused to grant a certificate to the city. It did so on the grounds
that, "The theory that the public are best served by two competing companies striving to
outdo each other by flying at each other's throats has long been exploded."
58 State ex rel. Electric Co. v. Atkinson, 275 Mo. 325, 204 S.W. 897 (1918).
50 In Montana such a provision has been held unconstitutional under the constitution
of that state. Helena Consolidated Water Co. v. Steele, 20 Mont. 1, 49 P. 382 (1897). Also
see Carlson v. City of Helena, 39 Mont. 82, 102 P. 39 (1909); State ex rel. Gerry v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 148, 111 P. 734 (1910). Cf. White v. Meadville, 177 Pa. St. 643,
35 A. 695 (1896); l\1et'Lger v. Beaver Falls, 178 Pa. St. 1, 35 A. 1134 (1896).
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pany cannot agree upon the price, then a procedure is provided for the
determination of fair value. This may be by the state public utilities
commission, by arbitrators or by the courts. 00 The statutes usually state
the factors or items to be considered in arriving at a fair value. In Connecticut and Florida the fair market value must include as an element
of value the earning capacity of the plant, based upon the actual earning being derived from the plant. 61
In some states the statutory requirement is met if the city attempts
to purchase an existing plant at a fair and reasonable price. If the company does not accept the price as found by the state commission or
arbitrators, then the city may proceed to construct a plant. If the city
refuses to proceed with the purchase after the price has been fixed it is
estopped from building a competing plant but must again follow the
statutory procedure for valuation and acquisition. A time limit, such
as two years, is usually fixed before the city may again institute purchase proceedings. Minnesota has a novel provision to limit the construction of duplicating plants. While a municipality may construct
or purchase a telephone exchange on approval of a majority of the
voters voting on the proposition, the favorable vote must be 65 per cent
of those voting thereon where an exchange already exists. 62
A less stringent type of statute which may reduce the number of
competing plants is that permitting but not requiring the city to acquire
an existing private plant. This is the case in states making use of the
indeterminate permit where a utility is by law deemed to consent to its
purchase by a municipality. 63 In states where private utilities may be
acquired by cities by the use of eminent domain, the necessity of setting
up a competing plant is avoided. In such cases, however, the policy is
left to the final determination of the city. Competing plants are still
possible but less probable.

V
CONCLUSION

The principle of regulated monopoly for public utility services is a
sound one and the use of competition is unwise. As in the case of most
oo Ala. Code (1940) §48-344, 345; Ariz. Code (1939) §27-901 to 27-921, §16-604; Ky.
Rev. Stat., (1948) §96.580; Wis. Stat. (1947) §196.50(4); Re City of Yuma, (Ariz. 1933)
2 P.U.R. (n.s.) 9.
01 Conn. Gen. Stat., Rev. (1930), §43-522; Fla. Stat. (1941) §172.09.
02 Minn. Stat. (1945) §237.19.
0 3 As illustrative see Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) §137-36.
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principles, however, there are exceptional cases.r. 4 Where regulation of
a privately owned utility has not been successful, and the people feel
that under regulated monopoly they are unable to secure adequate
service at fair rates, they have resorted to the device of a competing
plant. 06 The frequently resulting rate wars have usually resulted disastrously to either the private or municipal plant.'rn Acquisition of an
existing plant would in most cases be preferable to the construction of
a new competing plant. This may mean, however, that the city will
be forced to take over a run-down obsolescent plant when it believes
that good policy is to construct a new modern one.
While the principle of requiring a certificate of convenience and
necessity for a municipal plant when the territory is already served by
a private plant appears sound, cities may feel that it results in a policy
opposed to the extension of municipal ownership. If the commission
grants a certificate of convenience and necessity for a competing plant
it is in a sense a confession that regulated monopoly has not worked.
The agency which grants the certificate is the one responsible for making the principle work; thus, in a sense, it is a recognition of its O\\'n
failure. The threat of a competing plant may have a salutary effect on
tpe attitude of the privately owned utility in the service it renders and
the charges it makes. The competing plant is a gun behind the door
policy-to be seldom used but well to have if needed-and one that
should not be too severely limited by state laws.
04 For consideratiOI!S which may justify setting up a competing
WILCOX, THE ADMINISTRATION OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED UTILITIES

municipal plant, see
20 (1931).
o~ It was stated in the Final Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate
Public Utilities (N.Y.), Legis. Doc., no. 78, p. 86: " ... the Committee believes that where
regulation is not successful in bringing about reasonable rates, then the community suffering
from such unreasonable rates has no recourse other than a municipal plant or a so-called
'municipal yardstick.' "
60 The New York Commission considered this in refusing to approve the construction
of a competing electric plant by a village of 537 population, saying: "In determining to plunge
into this adventure without any real consideration of construction costs and without any consideration at all of operating costs, it is evident that the village was swayed by its temper
rather than by its judgment. The Commission is therefore called on to protect the village
against itself. Public convenience and necessity do not require a village to embark on a disastrous business enterprise.'' Re Village of Schenevus, (N.Y. 1919), P.U.R., 1919E, 735 at
737.

